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Abstract 
The modern framework of professional tax ethics is often given in reference to famous quotations of 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes or Judge Learned Hand.  The common quote from Holmes is that “the very 
meaning of a line in the law is that you may intentionally go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it”; 
Hand’s quote is that “there is nothing sinister in so arranging affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible... 
[a taxpayer] is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a 
patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”  However, there are two significant problems when these are 
applied to form the basis of tax ethics:  First, Holmes’ idea of “crossing the line” is taken as a presumption 
that tax laws are legally determinate.  They are not.  Every tax practitioner ought to be aware that tax laws 
are not legally determinate.  Accordingly, the limits of tax planning should not be expected to be clearly 
marked.  Second, Hand’s premise of the legitimacy of “arranging affairs” raises the problem of structuring.  
By structuring, the tax practitioner creates a convoluted and indeterminate transaction out of a previously 
known set of facts.  The respective “facts” then become slippery, just as Karl Llewellyn said, so the dream 
of tax law as a complete and fully valid set of intersecting code provisions dramatically falls apart.  The 
Internal Revenue Service has struggled to respond to this challenge with new penalties and ever-changing 
tests.  However, tax structuring represents a new animal in terms of legal philosophy comprising “Factual 
Indeterminacy”, where the underlying “facts” become indeterminate in various ways.  This changes things 
for tax ethics because the standard line—“the lawyer applies the law to the facts”—is not an exclusive 
description of tax lawyering.  By structuring, the tax lawyer is sometimes pushing toward indeterminacy.  
In nearly all other legal contexts lawyers push in the opposite direction away from indeterminacy.  Various 
ethics scholars have proposed that the tax lawyer merely acts in different roles in different contexts, and 
that personal standards of ethics (or, morals) could serve as a guide to ethical lawyering.  But, this 
approach appears to be merely a description of tax lawyering in various situations and not an ethical 
standard; any standard which merely refers to the idiosyncratic personal ethics or morality of the tax 
lawyer is tantamount to not having any ethical standard at all.  The lack of professional standards should 
be expected to have catastrophic consequences for the tax profession especially for younger tax 
practitioners looking for ethical guidance.  An illustration of an ethical dilemma is provided here using the 
actual terminology for responsibility for tax fraud within large corporations - “passing the monkey”.  An 
alternative framework of professional tax ethics based on the direction of tax planning toward or away 
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Tax ethics begins with the reasonable premise that a tax lawyer or accountant should not assist the client 
toward fraud or other illegal activity.0F1  Building on the writings of Justice Holmes, most tax scholars in 
both the United States and internationally propose a “bright-line” rule distinguishing mere “tax 
avoidance” from “tax evasion”.1F2  Tax evasion is given as an allusion to fraud or other illegal activity that is 
to be avoided.2F3  The relevant excerpt from Justice Holmes is as follows:  
The only purpose of the [taxpayer] was to escape taxation. … The fact that he desired to evade 
the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the very meaning of a line in the law is that you may 
intentionally go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it.3F4   
The lesson seems to be that on matters of “aggressive tax planning” a lawyer or accountant should see 
the clearly-marked fraud line and immediately know not to cross it.  This is similar in concept to the 38th 
parallel line dividing North and South Korea.  The DMZ is clearly marked on both sides and constitutes the 
demarcation line – only a fool or very desperate person would cross that line.  However, a legal standard 
that says merely don’t “cross the line” really tells us nothing about the nature of tax fraud except to warn 
that a line exists that should not be crossed. 4F5   The ubiquitous reference to Holmes is rather a description 
of the nature of tax law and compliance more generally, and thus an attempt to answer the more 
fundamental question of tax practice, a question that some tax scholars have even doubted,5F6—which is 
whether or not there is such a thing as wrongful conduct in professional tax practice.  
                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Accounting/Taxation, Indiana University - East, Richmond IN.  
1 See Donald Tobin, Richard Lavoire, Richard Trogolo, Problems in Tax Ethics (West: Thomson Reuters, 2009); Linda 
Galler & Michael B. Lang, Regulation of Tax Practice (Matthew Bender & Co., 2010); Debra Schenck, Bernard 
Wolfman & James Holden, Ethical Problems in Federal Tax Practice at 156 (Michie & Co., 1985) update edition. 
2 See Don Hansen, Rick Crosser & Doug Laufer, Moral Ethics v. Tax Ethics: The Case of Transfer Pricing Among 
Multinational Corporations, 11 J. Bus. Ethics 679 (1992); Zoë Prebble & John Prebble, The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 
43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 693, 715 (2010) citing Duke of Westminster v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1936] AC 1 at 
19-21 (Eng.) (“Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching under the appropriate 
Act is less than it otherwise would be.  If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, however 
unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be 
compelled to pay an increased tax.”). 
3 Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer´s Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1054 (1987) (“The prohibition 
of lawyer assistance in ‘criminal or fraudulent’ behavior has considerable appeal in identifying conduct in which the 
client has no proper claim to legal assistance. While different criminal acts may involve varying degrees of culpability, 
by designating conduct as ‘criminal’ the legislative authority clearly signifies that the conduct is normatively wrong.”) 
(citations omitted).  
4 Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390 (1930).   
5 Tobin, et al. at 190 (“Tax administration has long been hampered by taxpayers who seek deceptive and fraudulent 
means of avoiding tax.  These types of transactions are obviously illegal and a lawyer’s participation in advising, 
adding or marketing such transactions clearly violates ethical and statutory rules.”). 
6 See Robert W. McGee, Is Tax Evasion Unethical?, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 411, 434, 435 (1994) (“If there is nothing ethically 
wrong with tax evasion, it seems to follow that attorneys, accountants and financial planners should not be penalized 
for advising their clients to evade taxes or even for helping them to evade taxes. . . . If the advocacy of tax evasion is 
not unethical, and it appears that it is not, then a code of ethics that punishes individuals for advising their clients to 
evade taxes may itself be perpetrating an injustice because it is punishing someone for advocating something that 
is not unethical.”) see also Robert McGee, Three Views on the Ethics of Tax Evasion, 67 J. BUS. ETHICS 15 (2006) 
(describing three standards of ethics in tax evasion).  
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This article presumes that wrongful conduct in professional tax practice is possible in theory, and even 
further that it does exist in reality.6F7  Projects involving tax fraud at large organizations are often described 
in colloquial terms as “passing the monkey”.  This refers to pushing the responsibility for tax fraud to 
others usually down a chain of command.  The standards of professional tax ethics premised on the 
personal ethics or morality of the tax lawyer7F8 do not address this type of ethical problem that arises in 
“aggressive tax planning” projects.  The prior omission of this key aspect of tax practice means that a 
workable standard of professional tax ethics is urgently required for the good of the profession.8F9   
The philosophy of self-regulation by lawyers in the tax context has been viewed with skepticism by prior 
generations of tax scholars. For instance, Ann Southwood wrote: “Yet the bar has failed consistently to 
provide meaningful standards and discipline for its members in return for its status as a licensed 
profession closely tied with government and law enforcement.  The concept of self-regulation is 
fundamentally flawed.”9F10   If this is true, then the ethical problems described in this article are important 
because the tax profession could further cede its ability to self-regulate if popular frustration with the tax 
system grows and workable standards of tax ethics are not implemented.  The broad professional ethics 
standards given in the Model Rules comprise an invitation for the development of a common law on the 
subject of tax ethics.10F11  However, the development of ethical rules by a common law process would 
require decades if ethics enforcement cases were relatively common; but enforcement cases are in actual 
fact relatively uncommon, accordingly, the development of a common law on tax ethics might take longer 
than decades, perhaps centuries.  That may not be fast enough.  A workable ethical rule to limit aggressive 
tax planning to some degree is needed in the nearer future and within the lifetimes of the current 
generation of tax scholars and practitioners; the purpose of this article is to provide a first proposal based 
on the direction of tax planning toward or away from indeterminacy, especially Structuring Indeterminacy. 
                                                          
7 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 669, 682-3 (1981) (“This analysis indicates the dimensions of the lawyer’s duty under criminal and civil law to 
refrain from ‘assisting” a client in conduct that is ‘illegal.’  A lawyer violates that duty if… (3) The lawyer facilitates 
the client’s course of conduct either by giving advice that encourages the client to pursue the conduct or indicates 
how to reduce the risks of detection, or by performing an act that substantially furthers the course of conduct.”). 
8 See e.g. Linda Galler, The Tax Lawyer’s Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX REV. 681, 692 (1997) (“[T]he lawyer’s personal 
integrity is particularly significant in tax planning, where the lawyer assists her client in making or creating facts, 
rather than in characterizing events that have already occurred.”); Heather M. Field, Aggressive Tax Planning & the 
Ethical Tax Lawyer, 36 VA. TAX REV. 261, 265 (2017) (“So how should a tax planner, who wants to engage in 
‘permissible tax planning’ but not cross the line over into ‘unethical loophole lawyering,’ exercise her discretion and 
judgment? … [A] lawyer seeking to pursue a career as an ethical tax planner should identify and implement her 
philosophy of lawyering to help her make difficult discretionary tax advising decisions in a principled way, and when 
implementing that approach to tax lawyering, she should work to counteract the subtle factors that can skew her 
professional judgment.”). 
9 John S. Dzienkowski and Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Tax Adviser Professionalism in American Society, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2721 (2016); see also Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in the Professionalism of 
the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX REV. 589 (2003). 
10 Ann Southworth, Redefining the Attorney’s Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REV. 889, 905 (1985) (“However 
committed to public service individual members of the bar may be, lawyers as a group cannot subordinate their own 
interests to larger societal concerns.  Rather, they can agree only to ethical rules necessary to keep the public at 
bay.”). 
11 Hatfield at Chapter 3 (“[T]he Model Rules reflect the complex realities of lawyering, prescribing different standards 
for a lawyer working as an advisor, neutral third party, and advocate, as well as unavoidable duties to third parties, 
opposing counsel, and the tribunal.”). 
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II. Background – Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion and Tax Fraud 
Scholars in tax ethics typically refer to the supposed demarcation line between good and bad behavior 
amongst tax practitioners as the line between “tax avoidance” and “tax evasion”.11F12  The idea is that 
students of tax ethics might determine the meaning of “tax evasion” by referring to the other term, “tax 
avoidance”.12F13  Outside the United States, these buzz words are often taken to have specific meanings, 
whereas within the United States, it is often conceded that the meanings of the buzz words are insufficient 
to distinguish between legal and illegal conduct.  As Durst explained:  “In the past, analysis of the lawyer's 
professional obligations has been impeded by a tendency to assume that questions concerning the client's 
normative obligations have clear answers.”13F14  In the actual practice of law and accounting, tax structuring 
toward determinate tax outcomes is uncertain, and correspondingly, the ethics of conduct related to tax 
structuring is also uncertain.  
This paper proposes an alternative framework for professional tax ethics based on whether the direction 
for tax planning is toward or away from indeterminacy.  This approach should be distinguished to the idea 
of first positing a “bright-line” rule with the individual tax practitioner herself filling in the content 
regarding aggressive tax planning. At first blush, the latter apprach seems to sidestep potential ethics 
problems, such as situations where the lawyer may be thought to assist in aggressive tax planning that 
goes over the fraud demarcation line.14F15  Geoffrey Hazard described these type of ethical concerns in his 
article:  How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?15F16 In modern 
descriptions of tax ethics, we are led to believe this should never happen as long as the tax lawyer uses 
her internal moral compass to know where the line of legally wrongful conduct is and avoid going across 
it.  Nonetheless, the situation becomes more difficult where we begin to add uncertainty into the mix, 
both in the lawyer’s knowledge of what the client may be up to and in respect to various forms of legal 
uncertainty.16F17  Rather than a “bright-line” rule, Hazard posited a spectrum of lawyer conduct depending 
on the type of assistance offered to the client toward wrongful conduct. Hazard’s spectrum accounts for 
several different types of uncertainty in client assistance:  
At the least instrument end of the spectrum, the lawyer merely provides the client with an expert 
definition of the limits of the law, leaving it to the client to consider whether those limits should 
                                                          
12 Here, the term tax practitioner is used broadly to include tax lawyers and others.  See Galler & Lang at 171 (“The 
tax professional community includes a range of people with different levels and kinds of experience, education and 
professional licenses.  Members of this community include lawyers, CPAs, other accountants, enrolled agency, return 
preparers with limited experience, enrolled actuaries, [and others]….”). 
13 Id. at 683 (“It is important to point out that the transfer pricing scheme adopted constitutes legal planning for the 
minimization of the tax burden (e.g., tax avoidance).  Tax avoidance must be distinguished from tax evasion.  Tax 
evasion would clearly be viewed as unethical.  It is also illegal.  Tax evasion entails deception and concealment.  On 
the other hand, the taxpayer practicing tax avoidance is merely behaving in a way which hopefully will reduce tax 
liability.”). 
14 Durst at 1082. 
15 Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the System, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847, 852 (1999) 
(“[A] client can put a lawyer at risk if the client has committed tax fraud and the tax lawyer’s advice might assist in 
furthering the fraud.”) 
16 See Hazard at 676. 
17 Id. at 672 (“As the matter unfolds, it may appear to the lawyer that the portents of abuse are strong or weak, clear 
or ambiguous, firm or wavering.  When are these portents sufficiently certain so that the lawyer ‘knows’ that the 
client intends an illegal objective and is bent on its accomplishment?   
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be transgressed.  At the other end of the spectrum, the lawyer personally provides the means 
without which the client could not achieve the illicit purpose.17F18 
The scholarly discussions of the appropriate rendering of tax opinions by lawyers on tax shelters have 
concerned tax ethics scholars for many years.18F19 Yet these types of legal opinions on tax shelters seem to 
fall on the tame side of Hazard’s spectrum.  Tax structuring, on the other hand, seems more like a lawyer 
providing the means without which the client could not achieve a favorable tax result and, thus, seems to 
fall on the more questionable side of the spectrum.  If there is a spectrum of potentially wrongful conduct 
by tax lawyers rendering advice on aggressive tax planning, then concern over “tax evasion” is not limited 
merely to the marketing of tax shelters; ethical concerns might relate to other types of “aggressive tax 
planning,” especially structuring.  In respect of the oft-raised ethical concerns regarding legal opinions on 
tax shelters, the concern is that the tax laws are improperly drafted, or insufficiently precise, and leave 
open “loopholes”19F20 that can be exploited by a clever tax lawyer.20F21  To the contrary, the primary ethical 
concern is not legal “loopholes” due to poor statutory drafting,21F22 but structuring which would likely 
overcome any method of statutory drafting.  This is more precisely described as tax planning toward 
indeterminacy in the facts.22F23  This special type of indeterminacy is native to tax and will be explained 
further in Part V. 
Many of the more recent discussions of “aggressive tax planning” seem to place an emphasis on 
aggressiveness, yet once again, problems arise in that the key term “aggressive” is left undefined.  One is 
left to wonder whether there is a non-aggressive version of tax fraud; that would be I suppose a small 
businessman just taking a few dollars out of the till at a lawyer’s suggestion.  The truth is that the 
terminology and ethical standards when applied to “aggressive tax planning” are as close to free from 
content as any legal standard could be free from content.  At the very least, these standards leave the 
primary question of the scope of illegality in aggressive tax planning where “the lawyer personally 
provides the means without which the client could not achieve the illicit purpose” unanswered most of 
                                                          
18 Id. at 671. 
19 Galler & Lang at 55 citing Section 6692(d)(2)(C) defines the term “tax shelter” to mean a partnership or other 
entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement if a significant purpose of the 
partnership, entity, plan or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax. 
20 Holmes at 196 (“[C]lients want to push the limits of textualist interpretations in order to capitalize on loopholes 
that are created.”). 
21 David Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 Tax L. Rev. 331, 334-5 (2006) (“First, shelters (and, indeed, all aggressive 
planning) exploit poorly drafted statutes and regulations. The relevant rules are capable of being  read (albeit 
aggressively) to allow, for example, tax losses with no corresponding economic losses. Drafters need to be more 
effective in anticipating this sort of misreading. This task is especially important, and especially difficult, when judges 
focus on the text, instead of on congressional purpose, and construe ambiguities against the government. Textualist 
judges cannot be counted on to ask, "Why would Congress allow such a generous result?" Instead, they consider it 
the job of Congress or Treasury, not the courts, to shut down abusive transactions.”).  
22 Michael Schler, Effects of Anti-Tax-Shelter Rules on Nonshelter Tax Practice, TAX NOTES 915 (Nov. 14, 2005) (“I 
believe broad statutory antiabuse rules are necessary to combat tax shelters, because specific statutory language 
will never be sufficient to keep ahead of creative tax planners.”) citing Michael Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax 
Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 379-84 (2002). 
23 See generally Tobin, et al. at 190 (“A much more difficult question arises, however, when the transaction is not 
simply a fraudulent transaction, but is instead a complicated transaction that achieves significant tax savings by 
manipulating various tax provisions.  These transactions are also built on fanciful profit projections that almost never 
materialize.  In common parlance these transactions are referred to as tax shelters.”). 
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the time.  A more objective standard is needed first to identify “tax fraud” where it exists, and second to 
judge whether the tax lawyer materially assisted in that specific type of wrongful conduct.  Therefore, in 
tax ethics we really have two problems: We do not have an objective standard to determine tax fraud in 
the first place,23F24 nor do we have an objective standard to say whether the lawyer assisted in the fraud.   
A workable standard might be created based on the direction of aggressive tax planning.  The tax planning 
activity of tax lawyers and other practitioners could be classified as either toward or away from 
indeterminacy, or more specifically, toward the type of Factual Indeterminacy given as “Structuring 
Indeterminacy”.  The basic idea of the proposal is this:  Nearly everything that lawyers do outside of tax is 
designed to reduce uncertainty in legal contexts, whereas in tax structuring much of what tax lawyers do 
is designed to increase uncertainty.  That difference could be used to create a workable ethical standard 
that might function in practice.  The term “Factual Indeterminacy” is explained and applied further to tax 
ethics in Part V;24F25 and, the proposed standard for tax ethics based on the direction of movement within 
planning activity is described in Part VII.  As background, the concept of tax fraud is described next using 
the “passing the monkey” terminology that is often used within large corporations.  
(1) “Passing the Monkey”.  In the actual world of “aggressive tax planning” and tax fraud, tax executives 
rarely or never refer to “tax evasion”.  Executives instead often refer to tax fraud with its colloquial 
terminology as “passing the monkey”.  The “monkey” reference means that the unfortunate soul who 
gets assigned responsibility for the implementation of tax fraud thereby has the monkey on his back.  The 
monkey is rarely tame and has a tendency to bite and scratch and to ask for updates, timelines, and status 
reports. So, the goal within large corporations is to transfer the monkey to someone else, nearly always 
down the chain of command.  Success in pushing the monkey downward and avoiding responsibility for it 
oneself is what is meant by “passing the monkey”.  Really good and successful corporate executives are 
skilled experts in “passing the monkey” onward without anyone ever realizing they had it in the first place.  
This is not meant to trivialize the role of corporate executives, but rather acknowledges that skill in 
“passing the monkey” is a necessary and essential skill for survival in the corporate world and perhaps 
within other large organizations.  An illustration of “passing the monkey” is provide in Part VI. 
Yet, since “the monkey” is a very real and a thing that could be accounted for, and because “the monkey” 
was intentionally created as a company project by the higher-ups in the chain of command, it is 
accordingly not realistic or even plausible to think that a corporate lawyer, as example, might just 
withdraw from representation25F26 as the Model Rules discuss,26F27 nor pass the monkey back up the chain 
returning it from whence it arose.  This is why when fraud is discovered at big companies often the 
                                                          
24 Durst at 1054 (“The prohibition against assistance in ‘fraudulent’ conduct reflects universal social condemnation 
of deceit in interpersonal and commercial relations, as well as in legal proceedings, which depend on truthful 
presentations by opposing parties to resolve disputes fairly. From a strictly logical standpoint, the prohibition of 
assistance in ‘fraudulent’ activities may be unnecessary, because conduct that is fraudulent should, as a general rule, 
also involve potential criminal liability.”). 
25 Bret N. Bogenschneider, Factual Indeterminacy in International Tax Law, 3:3 BRICS L. J. 73 (2016) (“Rather, the 
manufacture of factual indeterminacy typically does not render a determinative legal result, and simply creates an 
unknown (i.e., indeterminate) application of tax law.”). 
26 Hazard at 670 (“There can be situations in which a lawyer’s duty is overborne by concern for personal survival.”). 
27 Galler & Lang at 115 (“Model Rules 1.6(b)(2) and (3).  The first permits a lawyer to reveal information relating to 
the representation of the client ‘to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary’ to ‘prevent the client from 
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another [i.e., the IRS] and in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.’”) 
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responsible person is found to be a junior employee within the organization representing the final person 
who received “the monkey” as a project and was unable to pass it any further.  Critically, the monkey does 
not pass up the chain, at least not very often.  One glaring problem in the terminology of tax ethics is that 
by using the words “tax evasion” this gives the impression that “tax evasion” is relatively rare and can be 
avoided if one just keeps on a close lookout.  However, tax fraud usually arises in situations of uncertainty 
which is referred to in philosophical terms as “Legal Indeterminacy”.27F28  Accordingly, if tax fraud was 
related to uncertainty rather than certainty, and instead referred to with its colloquial terminology as 
“passing the monkey”, along with an explanation of how tax fraud lives and breathes and scratches and 
bites in large organizations, then any legal or accounting student thinking about the subject of professional 
ethics for the first time would realize that the problem of tax fraud was very real.     
III. Legal Indeterminacy and Tax Ethics. 
The Holmesian quote as given above–“you may intentionally go as close to it as you can if you do not pass 
it”28F29–also suffers from severe problems related to legal indeterminacy.  The problem of legal 
indeterminacy is well-known in the existing literature.29F30  In tax contexts, the contemporary application of 
that maxim begins by taking that quote to presume determinacy in tax law.  The term “Legal 
Indeterminacy” refers to indeterminacy or the inability to find an answer, or just one possible answer, 
within legal frameworks on a legal question.  Although this problem can arise anywhere in the law it 
usually arises in legal frameworks that involve codes, like a tax code. 
Nonetheless, there are many legal and accounting scholars that think of the tax code as fully valid, 
meaning that any and all questions that arise in the field of taxation should be answerable by looking to 
the text of the code or through “interpretation” of its context.  So, if the answer is not covered in the 
actual text, it can be gleaned.  The term “legal interpretation” refers to gleaning content from context in 
this manner.  Significantly, even the leading positivist tax scholars in the world readily admit the potential 
for legal indeterminacy in the gleaning or “interpretation” process;30F31 basically, tax lawyers might glean in 
different ways and the difference in gleaning creates legal indeterminacy.  Other scholars often referred 
to as Legal Realists, going back to GWF Hegel, who was perhaps the first realist in legal interpretation, do 
not think that the tax code is fully valid.31F32  This means that there are factual situations not covered by the 
code itself or by a gleaning process from the framework of the code.  Under this view, Legal Indeterminacy 
exists because the code does not cover all possible situations and, as new situations arise, these may or 
will be indeterminate or unknown.  Luckily, it is not necessary to debate the issue further in this paper, 
since either way, positivist or realist, Legal Indeterminacy exists in the world.  And, the simple fact that 
Legal Indeterminacy exists creates several significant problems for the “bright line” view of tax ethics, four 
                                                          
28 Hazard at 672 (“[T]he question is how far a lawyer may go in conduct that might enable the client to accomplish 
an illegal purpose… [This] deals with the additional dimension of probability, or, to refer to it by another name, the 
dimension of uncertainty.”). 
29 However, Holmes’ legal analysis would look different under the tax laws that exist today. See Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1897). 
30 See e.g. Brian Bix, Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the Problem of Legal Indeterminacy, 16:3 RATIO 
JURIS 281 (2003). 
31 See Potács, M. (2015). Legal Theory (Kluwer, 2015) at Ch. V, sec. A, part 2 (‘Even Kelsen stressed the exact opposite: 
‘All previously developed methods of interpretation always lead only to a possible, not a single correct result.’ The 
assumption here is that legal positivism constitutes an objective meaning (or content) of legislation. However, this 
assumption does not exclude the possibility that the objective meaning of legislation is vague or indeterminate.’) 
32 See Bret Bogenschneider, 5 ½ Problems with Legal Positivism and Tax Law, PEPPERDINE LAW REV. (2017). 
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that are discussed here: (i) difficult cases; (ii) bona-fide disagreements; (iii) spectrum of “illegality”; and 
(iv) bad actors in the tax profession.   
(1) Difficult cases.  The first significant problem is that an ethical standard that refers to personal ethics 
or morality of the individual tax lawyer in the context of aggressive tax planning does not provide the basis 
for an accusation of ethical misconduct at all. The only way that tax misconduct could occur is if tax lawyers 
were to admit they violated the terms of their own morality.   Furthermore, even assuming that some 
easy cases exist where the lawyer could look to her own personal standards of ethics and work out a 
solution, it is safe to assume that tax lawyers and accountants usually do not often get assigned to the 
easy cases.  Many situations exist that are likely to involve ethical difficulty or even dilemmas where there 
is no answer under the applicable tax laws let alone the given ethical standards of prior cases.   
The related problem in difficult cases is that if the rules of professional ethics exist so as to discipline tax 
lawyers for misconduct, then there ought to be rules that provide an ethical choice or option, not a 
decision between two unethical alternatives.  If any situation exists under the rules of professional ethics 
that does not provide an ethical alternative for the tax practitioner, then there really is no guarantee of 
“mis”-conduct, as the tax practitioner legitimately may have chosen between the lesser of two evils.  If 
the tax practitioner correctly chose the lesser evil, then there may not have been any grounds of mistake 
to make an accusation of misconduct either.   
This absence of any mistake comprising “mis”-conduct is a severe shortcoming. In fact, it is so severe that 
it could be grounds to abandon the entire existing set of tax ethics rules as unworkable.   
 (2) Bona-fide Disagreements.  The second significant problem of Legal Indeterminacy, identified by 
Ronald Dworkin, arises when a highly-experienced and knowledgeable tax practitioner really thinks the 
situation is within the bounds of the tax law and this substantive view is later challenged by the IRS in 
audit or legal proceedings.  Later, the legal analysis reflected in the initial position is then found to be 
unethical by some reviewing body of professional conduct.  Let us assume here that the tax practitioner 
proceeded with the tax planning after a full substantive review that is well documented and bona fide in 
every possible way, except that the IRS does not agree with the ultimate conclusion.  The IRS then formally 
disagreed upon review, and the tax practitioner is determined not to have acted ethically and protests 
the decision.  The problem of Legal Indeterminacy has then become septic because the tax practitioner 
will not agree even with the benefit of hindsight that the tax planning decision was legally wrong, let alone 
ethically wrong.   
So, the question arises then, who decides if not the tax practitioner herself?  In order to implement an 
objective standard, that means someone else must step in later to render judgement about the meaning 
of the positive law and by implication the rules of tax ethics; Dworkin referred to this as the problem of 
hindsight where legal decisions are rendered by judges retroactively on bona-fide matters of dispute.  The 
retroactivity problem is magnified by many degrees in the context of professional tax ethics where there 
is not a judge and there may be no substantive legal content to know or guess how a novel tax decision 
might be decided in advance.  When confronted by hypotheticals raising this concern, experts in tax ethics 
will usually say something like: “Well, don’t put yourself in that situation.”  The actual standard that 
professional tax ethics promised is, thus, not a “bright line” standard at all, but is really the “you ought to 
have known what to do” standard of professional tax ethics.   
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(3) Spectrum of “Illegality”.  The third significant problem of Legal Indeterminacy as applied to tax ethics 
is that described by Hazard in relation to conduct that is by some degree illegal and to which the lawyer 
might assist.32F33  The client’s purpose is often relevant to the determination of degree of legality.33F34  Hazard’s 
approach directly challenges the idea that attorney conduct can be understood on a black-and-white 
basis; instead wrongful conduct exists along a spectrum.  Hazard wrote:  
By what criteria can the types of client conduct that it is legally improper for a lawyer to further 
be identified?  Put differently, what kind of wrongfulness should we include in the term ‘illegal’ 
for this purpose? … We may feel confident about including crimes that are mala in se, but as we 
move away from this core meaning, the boundaries become increasingly doubtful.34F35 
Aggressive tax planning seems often to fall into boundaries where the structuring is not mala in se.  This 
is to say that we do not have full criteria to identify wrongful conduct across the spectrum.  These criteria 
might differ between subject areas of the law.  Accordingly, if indeterminacy exists, then the goal of tax 
ethics is to identify criteria that might work in practice to delineate wrongful conduct.  As explained in 
Part VIII, the criteria proposed in this article is the direction of movement along the spectrum of wrongful 
conduct.   
(4) Bad Actors in the Tax Profession.  The fourth significant problem of Legal indeterminacy as applied to 
tax ethics is also described by Justice Holmes where the client has little or no respect for the law, or a 
Holmesian “bad man”.35F36  Most of professional tax ethics textbooks are filled with conclusions about what 
the lawyer should do when the client has made a false statement to the taxing authority, filed a false tax 
return, and similar problems.  The tax practitioner has no duty to amend an inaccurate tax return, for 
example.36F37  If the tax practitioner suspects the client is engaged in tax fraud, she may withdraw; if a tax 
lawyer knows the client is engaged in tax fraud using the lawyer’s services then she must withdraw.  These 
problems are often described in furtherance of the duty to the client versus the duty to the system.   But, 
either way, the rules of professional conduct describe what a lawyer should do in various difficult 
situations related mostly to litigation contexts.  In litigation, a noisy withdrawal is taken as potentially 
harmful to the client, for example.37F38  The withholding of services from a tax planning matter38F39 does not 
                                                          
33 Hazard at 672 (“Finally the question concerns actions by the client that is in some degree illegal.  ‘Illegality’ is itself 
a matter of degree.  The narrowest connotation of illegality is conduct violative of the criminal law that is mala in 
se.”). 
34 Id. at 678 (“The lawfulness of a lawyer’s conduct in aid of a client is determined in the first instance by reference 
to the client’s purpose, not the lawyer’s.”). 
35 Id. at 674 
36 See Bret N. Bogenschneider, Professional Ethics for the Tax Lawyer to the Holmesian “Bad Man”, 49:4 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 775 (2016); see also Tobin, et al. at 193 citing Sheldon Pollack & Jay Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 
105 Tax Notes 201, 205 n.31 (Oct. 11, 2004).  
37 See Michael Hatfield, Ethics of Tax Lawyering http://hatfieldethicsoftax.lawbooks.cali.org  
(“Ethical Problems for Tax Lawyers.  [S]everal distinction situations pose ethical problems for tax lawyers… such as 
discovering that a prior year’s tax return is incorrect or catching the IRS making a mistake in the client’s favor.”). 
38 Tobin, et al. at 55 (“A lawyer who knows or with reason believes that her services or work product are being used 
or are intended to be used by a client to perpetuate a fraud must withdraw from further representation of the client, 
and may disaffirm documents prepared in the course of the representation that are being, or will be, used in 
furtherance of the fraud, even though such a ‘noisy’ withdrawal may have the collateral effect of inferentially 
revealing client confidences.”). 
39 Holmes at 191.  
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seem as potentially harmful if the tax advisor can be readily replaced, and probably would not serve as a 
deterrent to a tax client as it might to a criminal defendant; on the other hand, a noisy withdrawal could 
very well be harmful to the career prospects of the lawyer or the relation of the firm to the respective 
client or other client.  Hence, the litigation-related rules of professional conduct are often not helpful in 
the context of aggressive tax planning because the context is different. 
The involvement of the tax lawyer gives the potential for attorney-client privilege or work-product 
privileges.39F40  This is extremely helpful to the Holmesian Bad Man.  As Hazard said: “It must be true, 
however, that some lawyers often help further their clients’ illegal purposes and that almost every lawyer 
at one time or another has provided assistance to clients that the lawyer suspected might be put to 
unlawful use.”40F41  The trouble is that the Holmesian “bad man” is aware of the existence of these privileges, 
and chooses to hire the tax practitioner exactly because the privileges are available and can be used to 
conceal fraudulent activity.  The “bad man” is also well-aware of the ethical rules applicable to tax 
practitioners; for instance, if the bad men is informed that some aspect of tax-planning raises ethical 
concerns to the tax practitioner, he will modify his behavior slightly to induce the tax practitioner to 
continue in the tax planning activity.   
The possibility that taxpayers are responsive to cues in the tax compliance process is not a new idea.  
Indeed, a whole new field within the burgeoning field of psychology and taxation has arisen referred to 
as “cooperative compliance”.41F42  Empirical evidence has been gathered that students will respond to 
compliance activities in varying ways depending on the methods of enforcement, suggesting that 
taxpayers might do the same in relations to the taxing authority.42F43  The existence of tax expertise within 
large corporations gives the impression that these well-advised taxpayers are more likely to be compliant 
with the tax laws; as Snider wrote: ‘Corporations were to be viewed as complicated organisms run by well-
intentioned, well-educated management teams. Harmful acts in which they might—accidentally, of 
course—engage were better handled by gentle persuasion or education rather than by arrest and 
prosecution.’43F44  The “cooperative compliance” initiative has accordingly gained traction especially in 
European states.  Significant problems arise when the client is a “bad man”, who might also be expected 
to respond similarly to incentives within the tax planning context.   
The presumption of the professional rules of tax conduct is essentially that the behavior of the client is 
static (i.e., the client already filed a false tax return, and then once the tax practitioner becomes aware 
she must decide what to do).  However, the professional rules are not so helpful in dynamic situations 
such as the following: (1) the Holmesian “bad man” conceals the existence of tax fraud by intentionally 
removing the tax practitioner from a crucial step in the tax process that would reveal the existence of the 
                                                          
40 The tax accountant gives only the tax practitioner privilege.   
41 Hazard at 669-70. 
42 Erich Kirchler, Cristoph Kogler & Stephan Muehlbacher, Cooperative Tax Compliance, 23:2 Curr. Dir. Psych. Science 
87-92 (April 2014) (“Whereas enforced compliance depends on the power of authorities, voluntary cooperation 
originates from taxpayers’ trust in the authorities… The psychological approach to tax behavior has led to a change 
in tax authorities’ practices for regulating citizen behavior. Under the labels of ‘enhanced relationships,’ ‘horizontal 
monitoring,’ and ‘fair-play initiatives,’ several European countries are advancing cooperative strategies with 
taxpayers.”). 
43 Id. 
44 L. Snider, Theft of Time: Disciplining Through Science and Law, 40 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 89, 90 (2002).; see also 
L.Osofsky, Some Realism about Responsive Tax Administration, 66 TAX LAW REV. 121 (2012).   
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fraud; (2) the Holmesian “bad man” is aware of or suspects ethical restrictions to the tax practitioner, and 
gives the impression that he is planning toward compliance, but is actually planning toward non-
compliance all along.  The existence of all the various privileges in the tax planning process is accordingly 
helpful to conceal aspects of planning activity during future litigation; if the planning turns out to be 
planning toward non-compliance, concealment with the aid of privileges is desirable.  However, no one 
will know the aggressive tax planning undertaken today was actually in the furtherance of tax fraud until 
years later, or perhaps never.  The crucial step from the perspective of the Holmesian “bad man” is just 
concealing the intent to fraud from the tax lawyer in order to gain the protection of the privileges.  This 
process of using an unwitting tax expert to further tax fraud obviously undermines the rule of law.  The 
pertinent question then, is if “bad man” behavior is possible, how common is it?  To answer that significant 
question, the paper uses the case example of tax structuring, especially the creation of “Factual 
Indeterminacy” in aggressive tax planning.  
IV. Structuring to Indeterminacy as part of “Aggressive Tax Planning” 
Over and over again the Courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging affairs as to 
keep taxes as low as possible. . . . Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes 
any public duty to pay more than the law demands.  Learned Hand, dissent44F45 
 
Outside persons not versed in the specialized field of taxation may be dubious as to the existence of 
structuring within tax planning activity.  It’s so much easier to assume that most tax practitioners operate 
on the mild side of Hazard’s spectrum of assistance toward wrongful conduct where the tax lawyer just 
gives some legal advice and then the client runs with it in unpredictable directions.  A non-tax lawyer 
might even wonder:  How could it be that tax lawyers and accountants are engaged in actually creating 
the facts that they then assess from a legal perspective?  And, if tax lawyers and accountants do happen 
to create the “facts”, this must be a relatively rare and ancillary event as it is in other areas of the law.  
Indeed, in other areas of finance, “structuring” financial transactions is a crime.45F46   
 
Although it would greatly simplify matters of tax ethics if factual structuring were not commonplace 
unfortunately, that is not the case in the real world.  In a simple world, analysis then could focus on the 
relatively easy questions in tax ethics of merely providing a legal opinion on tax shelters with a review of 
the facts underlying the shelter.  In tax planning for large multinational firms, nearly all effort by 
accounting and law firms is directed at sculpting the “facts” or even affirmatively creating “facts” that will 
be used to avoid taxation.  Notably, there are many ways to introduce uncertainty into tax results, but 
transfer pricing has become increasingly important as the means to do so especially as business has 
become more international; more and more, companies are able to produce goods and services in one 
taxing jurisdiction and shift these into another taxing jurisdiction. The crucial aspect of this type of 
aggressive tax planning, which has been largely skipped-over in the prior literature, is that the 
manufacture of facts does not necessarily create determinate legal analysis.  As such, it is necessary to 
introduce the topic and explain what this means for lawyers that are not specialized in taxation or even 





                                                          
45 Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); 
46 31 U.S. Code § 5324 - Structuring transactions to evade reporting requirement prohibited. 
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(1) Background on “Transfer Pricing”  
 
The topic of "transfer pricing" is really where much of the action is in tax ethics.  Transfer pricing refers to 
the intercompany prices companies charge their affiliates for goods and services.  This can be readily 
illustrated with respect to transfer pricing on finished goods, although the technical tax and related ethical 
issues often relate to transfer pricing on intangible goods and services.  For example, imagine a company 
that manufacturers carpets in India and imports them into the United States.  Once imported, the carpets 
are then offered for sale by the company’s own local affiliate incorporated here in the United States.  So, 
there are at least two legal entities, one in India that manufactures the carpets and one in the United 
States that sells the carpets.  The company then needs to decide how much to charge for carpets on the 
sale between India and the United States; the setting of the intercompany price will determine how much 
taxable income is reported in both India and the United States.  So, if the company charges itself a low 
price for carpets, then the carpets will be cheaper to the U.S. affiliate, and as a carpet is sold to the 
customer, more profit will arise in the United States. Alternately, if the company charges itself a high price 
for carpets, then the carpets will seem more expensive to its U.S .affiliate, and less profit will arise in the 
United States.  Accordingly, the taxes paid to both India and the United States depend entirely on the 
intercompany price that the company charges itself.   
 
The potential ethical concerns from the tax perspective should be obvious merely from this explanation 
of how setting the price is related to tax rates, such that the company incentive is to report less income 
in the jurisdiction with the higher tax rate.  Numerous academic studies have shown that the price charged 
varies by up to 6 fold (!) between companies, probably due to transfer pricing.46F47  Kimberly Clausing also 
has pointed out that economic models used in tax policy do not seem to take into account that companies 
are able to shift taxable income between taxing jurisdictions using transfer pricing techniques.47F48  
Therefore, the models used by economists to predict the economic consequences of shifts in tax policy 
are inaccurate, because they assume that taxable income will arise in the jurisdiction to where the 
substance of the activity relates (i.e., that a manufacturing company that manufactures carpets in India 
will report its manufacturing profits in India and its selling profits in the United States).  Tax results depend 
on the transfer pricing rules and whether those rules are enforced by the taxing authority in both 
jurisdictions.  The point is that transfer pricing matters to tax policy, and crucially, also to tax ethics.   
 
Various tax practitioners and accountants have identified the importance of transfer pricing to ethics.  A 
few articles have addressed the intersection of tax ethics and transfer pricing, albeit simply to reach 
conclusions along the lines that all transfer pricing must be ethically conducted by a tax 
practitioner.48F49  Hansen, et al. wrote:   
 
The regulations which govern transfer pricing allow the tax preparer to select among alternatives.  
Accordingly, tax avoidance is granted by statute.  Even an extreme moralist could not expect the 
taxpayer to opt for the most costly election.  The courts have upheld the rights of taxpayers to 
practice tax avoidance.  Tax avoidance is an acceptable motive in selecting between alternative, 
albeit choice of depreciation method or transfer pricing.49F50 
                                                          
47 James E. Wheeler, An Academic Look at Transfer Pricing in a Global Economy, TAX NOTES 87, 89 (July 4, 1988) 
(explaining the return on assets for US corporations is 6 times higher than for foreign-owned US subsidiaries 
indicating that transfer pricing is being used to reduce taxable profits allocated to the US).  
48 See Kimberly Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX LAW REV. 433 (2012). 
49 Robert W. McGee, Ethical Issues in Transfer Pricing, 7:2 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 24 (2010). 




Not exactly.  The ethical problem is that transfer pricing is not solely a question of legal interpretation, 
but relates directly to structuring. Transfer pricing may include a push toward Factual Indeterminacy, as 
explained in the next section.  Accordingly, the ethical issue relates to whether the structuring reaches a 
determinate answer, which is rarely (if ever) the case in matters of transfer pricing.   
 
V. “Factual Indeterminacy” in Tax Ethics. 
Various scholars have expressed disdain for “philosophical discussions” about tax ethics, which is a shame. 
An underlying philosophy, or rather, a proposed conceptualization of understanding aggressive tax 
planning is precisely what is needed to identify the methods to be used by tax practitioners.  That is, in 
order to begin a process of formulating an ethical rule for tax ethics we first need to say what is entailed 
by “tax evasion”, tax fraud, or simply “illegal” activity as described by Hazard.  This is the first necessary 
step in saying whether a lawyer or other tax practitioner has aided in that wrongful conduct.  The ethical 
problem actually cannot be solved by looking to examples of tax fraud, except by a common law process 
that would likely take centuries.  Since we do not have centuries, it is necessary to consult with philosophy.  
However, philosophy means method; philosophy does not mean esoteric proposals not related to 
practice.  Oddly, philosophy has gotten a bad name in tax where persons with no practical knowledge 
about taxation use it to step in and crowd out proposals from practicing tax lawyers and accountants.  
Philosophical methods in tax law are enhanced by looking to the methods of tax practitioners.  
Tax practitioners often refer to problems of legal interpretation, which is often referred to as legal 
indeterminacy.50F51  Yet the legal indeterminacy which Hazard described is not at all sufficient to describe 
indeterminacy in tax structuring.  Many other tax scholars have identified indeterminacy in tax planning.51F52  
However, many suppose that indeterminacy arises from the tax law meaning the law is itself inherently 
flawed.52F53  If this is the view it is wrong; leading tax practitioners also conclude that view is wrong based 
                                                          
51 Bogenschneider at XX (“[T]he potential for factual indeterminacy is not what is meant by the general usage of the 
term “legal indeterminacy”. in the theory of positive law (particularly as relevant to tax law) “legal indeterminacy” 
refers to the potential for differing interpretations of a given law. For example, where the legislature did not 
contemplate a particular situation in drafting a law the codified result may then be indeterminate in application. 
Both legal realists and positive law scholars allow for the potential of legal indeterminacy. however, the question 
not normally addressed by positive legal theory is: Where do legal “facts” come from? here, the reference to “facts” 
means the fact words necessary to identify the “facts” relevant to legal interpretation under the law.”) (citations 
omitted).  
52 Hansen, et al. at 683 (“Tax practitioners are faced with the challenging task of applying existing tax law to the 
factual situation of a particular entity for purposes of complying with requirements under the law.  The solution(s) 
which flow from this process often are not clear and concise.  When there is a lack of specific authority, or the law 
allows a choice between two or more alternatives, the tax practitioner will select the approach or alternative which 
minimizes the tax liability of the entity.”). 
53 Tobin, et al. at 211-2 (“Relating law to facts.  In discussing the legal issues in a tax shelter opinion, the lawyer 
should relate the law to the actual facts to the extent the facts are ascertainable when the offering materials are 
being circulated.  A lawyer should not issue a tax shelter opinion which disclaims responsibility for inquiring as to the 
accuracy of the facts, fails to analyze the critical facts or discusses purely hypothetical facts.  It is proper, however, 
to assume facts which are not currently ascertainable, such as the method of conducting future operations of the 
venture, so long as the factual assumptions are clearly identified as such in the offering materials, and are reasonable 
and complete.”); see also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. & Bradley T. Borden, Probability, Professionalism, and Protecting 
Taxpayers, 68 Tax Law. 83, 107 (2014) (“In addition, the practitioner must ascertain and consider all relevant facts, 
relate the applicable law -- including potentially applicable judicial doctrines -- to the relevant facts, and never, in 
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on long experience in the context of tax planning.53F54  The tax law cannot anticipate every possible shift in 
“facts” that tax lawyers and accountants might engineer at future times.  In other words, the tax law 
cannot be fully valid as to all current future situations; all of the experience of tax practitioners over the 
past 50 years establishes that is true beyond any possible doubt.  Apart from taxation, this also was true 
about the law generally in 1841 when GWF Hegel first said so, and remains true today.  Furthermore, all 
positivist legal scholars admit that laws are indeterminate.  The legal philosophy is filled with responses 
by positivist legal scholars objecting to an unfair characterization by Legal Realists that they are saying the 
law is fully determinate, which positivists deny.  Accordingly, there is no debate as to whether laws are 
indeterminate in practice; the debate is only as to why tax laws are indeterminate and to what degree.   
Therefore, the next step is to begin to categorize the types of indeterminacy beyond legal indeterminacy.  
In addition, there are at least two types of indeterminacy related to facts that are relevant to tax ethics, 
explained here as follows: (1) Factual Indeterminacy; (2) Structuring Indeterminacy.54F55 
1. Factual Indeterminacy.  Tax law often incorporates “facts” from other fields of law, such as corporate 
law.  Since the legal standards in other areas of law are indeterminate, this means the “facts” of tax law 
are indeterminate when legal conclusions are incorporated as “facts” into tax law.  The best illustration is 
as regard to legal entity classification.  The IRS eventually gave up on attempting to perform legal entity 
classification because the legal standards were indeterminate.55F56  Accordingly, this type of “Factual 
Indeterminacy” is why there is such as thing as “check the box”.56F57  When a tax practitioner “checks the 
box” to select a legal entity classification, this resolves a problem that would otherwise involve Factual 
Indeterminacy. 
2. Structuring Indeterminacy.  Separately, tax law always reserve the right to create its own “facts”; these 
are “facts” that are only known to tax lawyers or other practitioners.  A classic illustration is “original issue 
discount”.  There is no such thing as “original issue discount” except within the tax law.57F58  The ability to 
use such words relating to unique concepts of taxation is what it means to be a clever tax lawyer, as the 
use of certain tax words can establish “facts” in tax law. 
But, even more importantly, “facts” do not exist independent of theory.  As a clever tax practitioner 
engages in structuring activity, this often requires a theoretical explanation of why the tax restructuring 
is necessary, which predicates the gathering or creation of “facts” that exist in the new structure, but 
which did not exist (or were not relevant) before.  Therefore, the choice of legal theory entails a choice in 
“facts”.  This explains why the “facts” will often be viewed as commensurably different as between tax 
lawyers engaged on opposite sides in tax litigation or with different views on a tax planning structure.  
Nearly all “aggressive tax planning” will accordingly entail the affirmative creation of “facts”, or the 
sculpting of “facts” to fit into a revised theory reflected in the tax planning idea.  A tax partner at a large 
law or accounting firm is a person that can construct such a theory and then task associates with 
developing the necessary “facts” to fit into and support the theory.  As a matter of tax ethics, it is then 
                                                          
evaluating the merits of a tax position or transaction, ‘take into account the possibility that a tax return will not be 
audited or that a matter will not be raised on audit.’”).   
54 See Schler, supra, Note 22. 
55 This is “Mach/Feyerabend Factual Indeterminacy”; simplified here to “Factual Indeterminacy”. 
56 26 CFR § 301.7701-3. 
57 Id. 
58 Bret Bogenschneider, Wittgenstein on Why Tax Law is Comprehensible, [2015] BRITISH TAX REV. 252. 
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possible to categorize “structures” based on whether the structure is designed to increase or decrease 
indeterminacy.  This is explained in the Part VIII. 
VI. Illustration of Tax Fraud in Transfer Pricing. 
 
Nearly all of the prior descriptions of illegal activity in “aggressive tax planning” fail to give plausible 
descriptions of actual tax fraud.  A student may accordingly leave with the impression that fraud is rare or 
hard to find out in the wilds, like a white leopard.  In terms of its prevalence, finding tax fraud is less like 
a difficult searching for a white leopard in the Hindu Kush and more like a search for a garden ant in the 
backyard.  One tried-and-true means to commit fraud is to create two or more sets of books – one for the 
company, one for the auditors, or predictably, a separate set of books for the IRS.  Transfer pricing is no 
exception.  So, by way of introduction, it may be helpful to illustrate how transfer pricing can create tax 
fraud by using multiple sets of books.  Consider the following hypothetical:  
 
A company realizes that it has begun to make a lot of profit from sales of crackers in France.  The internal 
company forecasts suggest that the increase in sales will likely increase in the coming quarters.  However, 
the tax rate in France is high.  A corporate executive then suddenly realizes to his dismay that the tax rate 
in France is very high.  As the sales trend continues, the profits are going up but the taxes reported on the 
financial statements are also going up.  This is a problem not so much because the company will be 
required to pay taxes in France, but because the company calculates bonuses for corporate executives 
based on profits-after-tax.   So, the expected taxes booked and reported in the financial statements are 
reducing the potential for executive bonuses.  The high tax rate in France constitutes an emergency 
situation that must be addressed now.  Notably, the fraud which will arise in this hypothetical is designed 
to increase reportable profits and not to diminish cash taxes that will be paid.  This is crucially important 
because all of the fraudulent schemes that the taxing authorities may have made illegal over the years 
may still exist within the cost accounting structures of large corporations even if they are not intended to 
defraud the fisc by reducing taxes payable.  Tax ethics scholars are often focused on cash taxes when the 
real concern is reportable profits and transfer pricing relates to both or at times only the latter.   
 
Upon discovery of the tax problem in France, the corporate executive then contacts the head of tax, and 
says: “We’ve got a problem here.  The taxes in France are high and we are selling crackers really well, but 
the taxes are going to reduce profits this quarter.  What can we do?”  The head of tax then says, “Well, 
that’s no problem. We just need to update our transfer pricing structure for this unexpected increase in 
cracker sales in France.”  The updating of the transfer pricing structure is a possible solution because it 
could reduce the expected taxes that will be paid in the future for book accounting purposes.  As an 
extremely simplified illustration, this would occur by increasing the intercompany charges for crackers 
sold to the France affiliate.  Let’s assume the company manufactures the crackers in various countries and 
sells them over to France.   By modifying the transfer pricing structure to increase the charge for crackers, 
then the profits in France could be reduced and the expected taxes to be paid to France would also be 
reduced.  A more realistic example would involve adjusting the transfer pricing on the intangibles related 
to the manufacturing process for the crackers (i.e., patents) or the trademarks on the crackers.  
Significantly, the company is not so much concerned with whether the government of France will accept 
the adjustment at some point in the future.  The goal is to increase reported profits on the financial 
statements today; then if tax adjustments are required in the future, that might be embarrassing to 
whoever the head of tax is at the time of the adjustment, but it will only ultimately decrease somebody 
else’s bonus in the future.  By increasing profits today, everybody gets the bonuses from the increase in 
cracker sales in France. Therefore, the objective is to convince the internal company lawyers and perhaps 
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some auditors that the transfer pricing for crackers can be adjusted.  The head of tax would then ask 
herself, “How do we best do that?” 
 
The adjustment to a transfer pricing structure is not an easy thing if the intercompany contracts are 
already established that say how much to charge for crackers.  A large company will often have an 
intercompany structure that will explain the overall strategy, but it must be reflected in the legal 
documents.  The U.S. regulations require these to be set in advance.  But, crucially, the IRS does not audit 
the records every year.  Click.  The light bulb goes on.  What if the transfer pricing documents were 
malleable, with a more aggressive version created in advance for an emergency such as this?  The transfer 
pricing structure could then be changed and updated upon the occurrence of unexpected events.  This 
would make it possible for the company to make adjustments for future events that are not known today. 
That is, retroactive adjustments to the transfer pricing structure could be made with the benefit of 
hindsight.   This sort of malleability in the structure could be really helpful, say, if sales unexpectedly 
increase.  So, the head of tax asks herself:  How do we make transfer pricing records malleable?  Click.  
Another light bulb goes on. We just need to create multiple sets of transfer pricing contracts.  A different 
contract could apply in different situations to change the tax result.  But, how do we accomplish that?  
 
In order to create multiple sets of transfer pricing documents within a large company, one needs the 
witting or unwitting assistance of the lawyer who is responsible for the intercompany contracts.  So, how 
does one get a lawyer to create two sets of transfer pricing documents related to France and the affiliates 
involved in the manufacture of crackers?  One method is to take two different set of intercompany 
contracts to multiple lawyers at different times. To be safe, one may be an external lawyer that the 
internal lawyer doesn’t even know has been engaged by the company.  This avoids the uncomfortable 
possibility that the internal lawyer could discover that someone else is working on the same transfer 
pricing project, but with a different set of contracts with different terms.  Then, once you get two sets of 
contracts done, you put both in your desk, and just pull out the one you like best when the time is right.  
Also, the contracts have to be signed by an executive with signing authority for each intercompany 
affiliate;  although the executives are often more than willing to participate in the fraud, somebody has 
to sign both sets of documents in the signature field.  The risk is that in the future, someone might ask 
why the executive signed transfer pricing documents both valid for the same dates.  Hence, if the two sets 
of contracts are both available and dated, then there is the possibility that the internal company auditors 
will discover at some future point that there were two sets of documents.  The head of tax says to herself:  
To avoid discovery we can just take the dates off the contract.  With multiple sets of transfer pricing 
documents, at least one of which has been “no-dated”, then we can always have the possibility of using 
two.58F59   
 
The head of tax may then attempt to shift responsibility for the transfer pricing fraud to another person 
down the chain of command.  Responsibility for the “no-dated” version of the transfer pricing contracts 
could be assigned to a junior lawyer as her project to review and obtain signatures from the appropriate 
corporate officers.  If the junior lawyer does not notice the missing dates or does not grasp the significance 
of the lack of dates and obtains a signature from the corporate officers with signatory power for the 
affiliate, then she effectively assumes responsibility for the fraud.  Alternately, if the junior lawyer 
identifies an issue and affirmatively puts dates on the contract, then the head of tax may just throw the 
contracts in the trash.  This is a classic example of “passing the monkey” in a corporate setting.  At 
                                                          
59 See generally Dzienkowski and Peroni at 2728 (“Tax professionals have an obligation to represent their clients 
zealously within the bounds of the law.  In other words, no one suggests that a tax adviser should advise clients to 
falsify documents or backdate documents that have tax effect.”). 
18 
 
minimum, the “blame the junior associate” gambit is available to the head of tax who may testify that the 
fraud was all the junior tax lawyer’s idea.   
 
From the hypothetical, it should be evident that an ethical dilemma occurs to the junior tax lawyer when 
she is provided the “no-dated” version of the transfer pricing contracts from her superior and instructed 
to get the necessary signatures.  Assume for purposes of the hypothetical that she has no idea why the 
dates are being removed from the contracts,59F60 and her superior, who orchestrated the whole endeavor, 
says its normal not to use dates.  Query:  How does the tax lawyer proceed when the “no-dated” version 
of the contracts is provided for signature?60F61  Does she have a duty to inquire further?61F62  Does it matter if 
the tax lawyer knows her superior is a crook from other situations?62F63  
  
1. Raise an ethical concern.  If the lawyer raises the ethical concern based on a standard of personal ethics, 
this will have no effect on the project ab initio because the superiors within the organization are already 
aware of the possible fraud and have reached their own conclusion that the project should proceed.  One 
purpose of having a superior in any organization is that the superior assigns the projects in the 
organization, fraudulent or not.  However, if the tax lawyer raised the ethical concern about the potential 
violation of an actual ethical rule, then there could be a discussion about the ethics of multiple versions 
of “no-dated” transfer pricing documents, for example.  Therefore, the use of a personal ethical standard 
known only to the tax lawyer herself may be the least effective ethical rule; even a bad rule would create 
the potential to raise a concern that might be valid and could form the basis for a discussion of the ethics 
with someone else.  The use of the personal ethics standard leaves the tax lawyer with no substantive 
grounds to raise an ethics concern that might be persuasive to another person that has already decided 
to undertake the project.  If there were a common law of tax ethics, the tax lawyer could conceivably find 
these cases and try to draw out the lessons to her supervisor, but that also seems impracticable.   
Even worse, by raising the ethical concern the tax lawyer has severely harmed her personal prospects in 
at least two ways:  First, assuming the tax fraud is subsequently discovered, if the lawyer proceeds with 
the project and does not resign from her position, she has admitted her own responsibility and conceded 
legitimate concerns about the fraudulent activity.  This is true even if the tax lawyer is understandably 
                                                          
60 Hazard at 672 (“It is rare that the lawyer fully knows a client’s purposes or fully anticipates the ways in which the 
client might make use of the lawyer’s services.”). 
61 See Galler & Lang at 64 (“In gathering information, the preparer may in good faith without verification rely on 
information provided by the taxpayer and information and advice provided by third parties.  Treas. Reg. 2.6694-
1(e)(1).  However, the preparer cannot rely on information that appears either on its face or from other facts known 
to the preparer to be incorrect, incomplete or inconsistent.”). 
62 Galler & Lang at 11 (“The difficult problem arises where the client has in fact  misled but without the lawyer’s 
knowledge or participation.  In that situation, upon discovery of the misrepresentation, the lawyer must advise the 
client to correct the statement; if the client refuses, the lawyer’s obligation depends on the situation.”); Tobin, et al. 
at 211 (“[T]he lawyer should, in the first instance, make inquiry of the client as to the relevant fact and receive 
answers.  If any of the alleged facts, or the alleged facts taken as a whole, are incomplete in a material respect; or 
are suspect; or are inconsistent; or either on their face or on the basis of other known facts are open to question, 
the lawyer should make further inquiry.”) citing ABA Formal Opinion 355 (1974). 
63 Tobin, et al. at 67; see also Hazard at 672 (“It is sometimes suggested that the dilemma is false, because surely a 
lawyer cannot ‘know’ what a client intends.  This suggestion is either disingenuous or absurd.  Of course, speaking 
in radical epistemology, it is true that a lawyer cannot ‘know’ what a client – or anyone else – intends.  In these terms 
it is impossible for a lawyer to ‘know’ anything.  Yet the practice of law is based on practical knowledge, that is, 




uncertain about the tax result because it may contain various elements of uncertainty and create 
indeterminacy in various ways; even if there was a possible argument that creating multiple versions of 
“no-dated” transfer pricing documentation was legal, once the ethical concern has been raised, the tax 
lawyer would then not seem able to raise that indeterminacy argument later if prosecuted by the state 
bar for carrying out the fraud.   
A second way that the tax lawyer has harmed her personal prospects is by violating a cardinal rule in the 
eyes of her superiors which is to attempt to “pass the monkey” up the chain.  The worst scenario is that 
her superiors may have been trying to implement a version of the “blame the junior associate” gambit to 
avoid ethical responsibility for the fraud themselves.  Although the gambit is no longer available in law 
firms, it is still readily available within large corporations.  This strategy could arrive at an end result where 
the junior lawyer ultimately takes the blame for the fraud, but suffers no consequence; conceivably, she  
subsequently could be determined not ethically culpable because she is young and dumb.  However, by 
raising the personal ethics complaint, the junior lawyer admits she was not dumb and has thereby 
undermined her superior’s attempts to “pass the monkey” downward.   
2. Do not raise an ethical concern.  If the lawyer does not raise an ethics concern based on standards of 
personal ethics derived from her “moral compass”, the results will also be dramatically negative.  First, 
most importantly, as every self-respecting fan of the Goodfellas gangster film should know, complicity in 
one instance of fraud, the tax lawyer has now joined in every other instance of fraud in the organization.  
That is, by complicity in the tax fraud, she now knows where a body is buried but everybody else now 
knows where her bodies are buried.  Therefore, no complicit person can ever realistically raise an ethics 
concern in the future, who has failed to raise an ethics concern in the present.  If other corporate 
executives are aware of the Goodfellas rule, it is possible to continuously test a younger lawyer on ethics 
matter until complicity is achieved, or perhaps not achieved; when attempts to achieve complicity in fraud 
fail, then the underachiever can be simply be fired, removed, or worse.  The failure to set workable 
standards of tax ethics yields the perverse situation within large organizations with some propensity to 
fraud that only the non-ethical persons will survive for very long within the organization.  Notably, the 
Goodfellas concern described in this paragraph is perhaps the strongest argument for ethical standards in 
the tax profession.   
Second, by failing to raise the ethical concern, upon review, she inevitably is less likely to meet the 
applicable standard of tax ethics—“you should have known what to do”, as described above.  The ethical 
concern such as tax fraud, the given standard implies both an ethical, and furthermore, a substantive 
failure to apply the tax laws correctly to the situation.  Insofar as the modern view of tax ethics applies a 
“you should have known what to do” standard, the reviewer is stepping into the shoes of the lawyer with 
the benefit of hindsight, and then, second-guessing the actual legal judgment of the tax lawyer in the 
specific situation.63F64  By not raising any concern, the lawyer has waived the substantive aspect of her tax 
analysis.  Thus, in theory, the prosecution of the tax lawyer then could extend both to an ethics violation 
and also to legal malpractice.   
                                                          
64 Hazard at 683 (“Should the license to practice law not only lawyers to provide assistance requiring professional 
legal judgment, but also permit them to provide assistance that otherwise would constitute complicity in an 
intentional tort or crime?  This author thinks not; the inquiry, however, goes on.”). 
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Third, in not raising the ethical concern, the tax lawyer may have failed to take into account her duty to 
the system.64F65  Although that may be true, one ray of light is that, in the hypothetical, it is presumed the 
company is inexorably moving forward with the potential fraud as a project.  The lawyer’s duty to the 
system is therefore mediated through the responsibility to file an internal report of fraud within the 
company; the compliance with federal regulations on that point might satisfy the duty to the system.   
VII. Alternate Proposal for Tax Ethics. 
The purpose of this section is to show the relevance of factual planning to professional tax ethics by 
evaluating the direction of tax planning as toward or away from indeterminacy.  This approach can be 
perhaps best illustrated by distinguishing between the use of factual planning in two different scenarios, 
as follows:  
Scenario #1:  Tax planning toward determinacy.   
The tax lawyer assists in structuring to create a legal outcome that is known or determinate.  An example 
would be the formation of an offshore affiliate as a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rather than as a 
branch.  This is achieved by incorporating in the foreign country.  Here, the tax lawyer sets up the legal 
entity and the tax result is often determinative, at least in situations where the tax treaty has provisions 
that provide for the treatment of foreign corporations in comparison to branches.  In many countries, 
including the United States, the tax issues are made determinative by allowing the taxpayer to elect the 
form of the legal entity by filing an election form with the taxing authority.   
Scenario #2:  Tax planning toward uncertainty or Factual Indeterminacy.   
In tax structuring toward uncertainty or “Factual Indeterminacy”, the tax lawyer assists in structuring to 
create a legal outcome that is unknown or indeterminate.  A classic example would be the creation of a 
transfer pricing structure with the formation of an intangibles holding company in the Cayman Islands, 
where the tax rate on royalty income is 0%.  The idea is that the multinational firm headquartered in the 
United States might shift intangibles from a high-tax jurisdiction, such as intangibles for a fashion brand 
developed in Italy as example, into a low-tax jurisdiction, here the Cayman Islands.  For purposes of this 
hypothetical, assume that before the restructuring there was a fashion brand in Italy that licensed rights 
for worldwide production of the brand and the profits flowed back to Italy; after the restructuring, the 
intangibles are owned in the Cayman Islands, which reduces taxes because the license fees flow from the 
rest of the world to that low-tax jurisdiction rather than to Italy.  This structure can also be done 
domestically to avoid state income taxation such as by the transfer of intangibles from a high-tax state, 
such as Massachusetts, New York, and California, into a low-taxed state, such as Delaware.  The goal is to 
achieve a situation where the royalty payments are deductible in the high-tax jurisdiction when paid, and 
not subject to tax in the low-tax jurisdiction when received.   The tax structure causes the royalty income 
not to be taxable, and creates a tax deduction that could reduce tax from other income. This is referred 
to as the creation of an “IP holding company” structure.65F66   
                                                          
65 See David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided:  Duties to Clients and Duties to Others—the Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys 
Made Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169 (2009); Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, 
Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the System, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847 (1999). 
66 See Bret Bogenschneider and Ruth Heilmeier, Google´s “Alphabet Soup” in Delaware, 16 HOUSTON J. BUS. LAW & 
TAXATION 1 (2016). 
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The tax planning involved in setting up an “IP holding company” structure involves layers of possible 
uncertainty. Here, there are many areas ranging from legal uncertainty in the structure to factual 
indeterminacy related to the transfer, including:  
1. Legal indeterminacy as to the treatment of IP holding companies under the ring-fencing rules 
of Italian law.  This is a legal issue in Italy that will determine the “facts” as a matter of tax law 
(so is technically a type of Factual Indeterminacy also);  
2. Uncertainty as to whether the description of the business operations used for purposes of the 
tax structuring actually match to the real business operations to any significant degree;  
3. “Factual Indeterminacy” related to whether the intangibles have actually been shifted in 
substance to the Cayman Islands; and 
4. “Structuring Indeterminacy” relating to uncertainty as to whether the price paid for the 
intangibles was adequate based on an appraisal or other documentation.  
The critical issue is the identification of “Structuring Indeterminacy”.66F67  The tax structuring itself gave rise 
to the underlying “facts” in the appraisal document; absent the structuring, these facts would not exist or 
would not be relevant.  The documents are necessary because since there is no third-party buyer of the 
assets to establish a price; the tax consequences depend on an appraisal to determine the value for tax 
purposes.  Therefore, the entire structure hinges on the appraisal being low-enough, such that the 
ongoing tax savings from the structure are not dwarfed by a tax bill resulting from the transfer itself.   
(1) Diagram of Direction of “Aggressive Tax Planning” Activity 












In tax ethics there is often presumed to be a clear demarcation line between “tax avoidance” and “tax 
evasion”.  The personal ethics of the tax lawyer has been repeatedly proposed by scholars as a primary 
factor in placing limits on aggressive tax planning.  The ethical requirements also depend on the role the 
                                                          













tax lawyer has undertaken in various contexts under the Model Rules.67F68  Yet, as identified and explained 
by Hazard, wrongful conduct by an attorney in assisting a client toward tax fraud exists along a spectrum.  
Therefore, a “bright line” rule is not workable in many contexts.  Furthermore, the “moral compass” 
ethical rule has no content unless the tax lawyer being prosecuted for misconduct admits, against her own 
interests, that she did not follow her own moral standards.   
An additional issue that has not been raised in the prior literature is whether a tax lawyer has obligations 
to a system of professional ethics (both under state law and by the IRS) when that system does not provide 
reciprocal duties and responsibilities of fairplay to the lawyer or tax practitioner.  An ethical standard that 
is not reciprocal among members of a bar or profession, for example, would not be an ethical standard.  
Likewise, where the Model Rules fail to provide a workable standard of ethics in the context of “aggressive 
tax planning”, this creates potentially serious problems in assessing the validity of those rules.  As 
illustration, if the conclusion under the Model Rules is that, in contexts of “aggressive tax planning”, the 
tax lawyer should apply her own moral compass to reach an ethical result, then how could a state bar 
applying those Model Rules set out to review decisions made under the individual moral compass of each 
member?  The so-called ethics review could only be as to whether the bar member has violated her own 
ethical standards.  Of course, this is not properly described as “ethics” or “professional responsibility” and 
represents simply confusion about personal morality versus professional ethics.  Ethical standards are 
standard of a profession imposed across members of a profession and are not individual moral standards 
reflected in a “moral compass”.68F69  Rather, it seems axiomatic that any ethics rule requires ethical 
standards apart from the moral compass of the lawyer herself even if moral standards were good and 
standards of professional ethics in practice were sufficient.  One purpose of this article has been to 
illustrate that they are not.   
The “duty to the system” is also not so simple as we have previously been led to believe.  If the tax lawyer 
reasonably looks at the world of tax practice and sees many bad actors, then perhaps the “duty to the 
system” should also require her to try to limit aggregate fraud to the best of her ability.  Although not 
discussed in the prior literature, a strong argument against the duty standards given in respect to taxation 
is that any tax lawyer with a whisper of ethics is effectively required to die in a ditch; this ditch is likely the 
first position of new tax lawyers in the trenches of professional tax practice based on a bureaucratic 
system of “passing the monkey” downward.69F70  
In conclusion, proposals for an alternative framework for tax ethics are needed.  One possible idea is to 
begin with an assessment of the direction of aggressive tax planning activity either toward or away from 
Factual Indeterminacy.  Just as Hazard described, this approach views lawyer assistance in tax planning 
                                                          
68 For a broader discussion of the various roles tax lawyers can serve see: Rachelle Y. Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as 
Gatekeeper, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185, 188-89 (2010) (“Yet, under the current tax regime, it is not unusual for the 
tax lawyer to play the roles of advisor, advocate, endorser, insurer, engineer, and even adversary.  It can be a tricky 
business wearing all of these hats, particularly when tax lawyers are facing mounting pressures from powerful clients 
aggressively pushing to minimize their tax liabilities.”).  
69 See generally Deborah H. Schenk, Book Review: Tax Ethics, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2007 (1982) (“[Tax ethics should 
provide] a sufficient framework to enable a student to develop his own ethical norms.  Students should begin (or 
perhaps end) an ethics course by asking the following questions:  Are professional ethics and personal ethics the 
same? Are they mutually exclusive or even related? Where should a lawyer look for answers to ethical questions 
that arise in practice?”). 
70 See e.g. Galler & Lang at 115. 
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along a spectrum of wrongful conduct.  In nearly all other legal contexts apart from aggressive tax 
planning, lawyers push away from indeterminacy, whereas the tax lawyer by Factual Structuring 
sometimes pushes toward indeterminacy.70F71 As the lawyer or tax practitioner engages in tax structuring 
and thereby pushes forward along the spectrum, that forward movement could be viewed as a hallmark 
of unethical conduct.  Tax structuring designed to take an uncertain position and make it certain; thereby  
moving toward determinacy would not be implicated.  This standard would not work in all cases, but it 
would work far better than a standard based on the “personal ethics” of the individual lawyer, or even, 
inquiry as to whether a taxpayer might have a “business purpose” for structuring to tax avoidance.  Such 
an ethical rule would thereby restrict structuring activity designed to affirmatively create indeterminacy 






                                                          
71 For a further discussion of practical issues in tax ethics see: Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 47, 53 (2010); see also Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA Formal 
Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 643 (1986). 
 
